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Generations of students have learned from their professors of economics that
productive resources are limited, and that, as a result, everything cannot be done

at once. Producing more of any one good or service generally requires that less of
some other(s) be produced; such is the venerable law of scarcity. Societies, unable
to do everything, must somehow choose what things to do first; scarcity requires
"economizing," or choosing the best use of limited resources.
A superficial reading of recent economic thought might appear to qualify this
law. The presence of unemployed labor and capital makes it possible to increase
outputs of some things without diminishing the outputs of anything else. Thus it
might seem that under conditions prevailing in the i93os or, to a lesser degree, in
recent years, the law of scarcity fails to hold.
This is, as we have suggested, only a superficial view. A closer examination of
the matter will reveal that the necessity for choice still stands. Under conditions of
general unemployment of labor and capital, most present-day economists would
prescribe monetary, fiscal, and other policy actions designed to raise the effective
demand for goods and services, and thus put idle productive resources to work.
Various monetary and tax devices, for example, might be (and recently in the United
States have been) used to increase private business investment. Other types of
tax reduction can stimulate consumer demand, while governments, particularly the
federal government, may directly increase the demand for produced goods and
services by raising government spending for collective consumption or investment.
In other words, there are many different ways to increase demand and put unemployed productive resources to work. Even though unemployment means that
we have room to expand demand and thus get more of everything, we must still
make a decision as to more of what; the necessity for choice is as urgent as ever.
We may have more consumer goods, more capital goods or more public goods, but
we must somehow choose how much of each. As usual, choosing more of one thing
involves choosing less of another. Every selection of policies to increase demand
and to reduce unemployment is also a choice as between various kinds of goods:
public or private goods, consumer or investment goods. In summary, when the
economy is at full employment, the traditional view of scarcity prevails; spending
more on something (say defense) means spending less on something else (say poverty
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programs). With unemployment, the same necessity for choice is present, but it
appears in the selection of policies to increase demand.
Viewing matters in this light, much of the recent public uproar over military
spending for the war in Viet Nam versus spending for the "war on poverty" seems
misleading in at least two ways. First, many writers seem to be saying that spending
for poverty programs may have been all right when there was "slack" in the economy
(or, as we would prefer to put it, when there were unemployed resources) but now
that we are approaching full employment, we can no longer afford poverty programs.
It would be much more accurate to say that the human and material resources put
into antipoverty efforts could have been directed toward other ends all along. If
we think that they are being misused now (in the sense of being directed toward
less urgent ends), then they were probably being misused all along. Of course, the
movement to a limited war footing may reorder priorities; in this sense it would be
accurate to say that we can no longer afford any particular set of goods or services.
Further, as we shall stress below, there is the possibility of a greatly expanded war
effort; any decisions as to spending should take into account possibilities of rapid
future shifts as well as present priorities.
A second misleading aspect of the present public discussion is the implication
that poverty programs compete for resources only with military uses. No great
intelligence is required to see otherwise; any one use of productive resources competes to some extent with all other possible uses. Military spending and poverty programs compete with private consumption and private investment, as well as all other
objects of public expenditure.
The return of something like full employment does, of course, focus attention
on the choices to be made. Indications seem clear that some types of spending,
public or private, must be curtailed or we are likely to witness a considerable
acceleration in the rate of price increases. We shall assume that, whatever the merits
of the Viet Nam situation, military spending will take first priority. This does not
necessarily mean that spending for poverty programs must be reduced, but it does
certainly suggest that some spending for something must be reduced if inflation is to
be avoided. What is indicated is that poverty programs and all other objects of
public expenditure need to be carefully re-evaluated with respect to their costs and
their benefits.
We may state, as a general principle, that any public programs for which benefits
exceed costs should be retained, and paid for with higher taxes, if necessary. This
is much easier to state as a general principle than to implement in any particular
case. It does make clear, however, that the increase in military spending does not
automatically require a cut in federal non-defense spending. If any programs are
thought to be more useful than the expenditure on private goods of an equivalent
sum, the principle of optimal resource use indicates raising taxes and continuing the
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programs. If government programs, poverty or otherwise, cannot meet this test, they

should be dropped.
Resources employed in the poverty program, to repeat, have alternative uses.
If they bring higher returns in their antipoverty uses than in producing other
public or private goods and services, they should remain where they are. Further,
there are frequently several different ways of accomplishing any given end, a truth
of which our military establishment has been persuaded (with great effort) by Mr.
McNamara. Businessmen would, and anyone should, naturally choose the least
costly of several equally effective methods. These two considerations suggest what
it is we need to know about the poverty programs, with more precision than has been
yet offered.
First, what are the expected returns from the outlays? They are, of course, partly
monetary and partly intangible. In the latter area we can proceed only by value judgments, but this need not preclude efforts to identify and estimate monetary returns to
individuals, to the government, and to the economy. We must also bear in mind
that costs of the programs include earnings foregone by participants in addition to
direct government outlays. Quite possibly, some outlays might be justified by
monetary returns alone, with all non-monetary benefits as clear gain to the economy.
Or all outlays may so greatly exceed any conceivable monetary benefits that even
over-generous allowances for intangible benefits could not justify the programs.
How, for example, does the cost of retraining workers, on the average, compare with
estimated additional earnings? With respect to the Job Corps, how much outlay per
enrollee would be covered by estimated higher lifetime earnings? What percentage
of success has been attained with the first classes, and which way does this percentage move with subsequent classes? At what percentage of success does the
program "break even," given present costs and estimated higher earnings? One
could readily design a full research agenda of similar questions for each phase of
the program.
A second research agenda relates to alternative means of accomplishing desired
ends. To some extent, rising demand and employment in themselves open exits from
poverty income levels, even without special programs. In fact, widespread prosperity
in some small measure works against some poverty program objectives by raising
earnings of unskilled workers and encouraging marginal students to leave school.

For each poverty program, what other means might accomplish each desired end?
Could not more youths simply be taken into the armed forces even if mental and
physical standards were relaxed somewhat?

To the (possibly considerable) extent

that inexperienced workers are "structurally" unemployable because of minimum
wage legislation and other employment costs, might it not be profitable to erase such
barriers and, if necessary, supplement low earnings in various other ways? What, in
short, are other possible means of diminishing poverty, and what are their costs?
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We must also keep in mind the possibility of a sudden acceleration in military
spending and the resulting present need to maintain maximum flexibility in resource
use. Further, the returns from antipoverty efforts may be far in the future; the
appropriate rate for discounting them to the present may vary with the changing
military situation.
We might pause at this point to consider in more detail questions of inflation
and full employment. Full employment does not, of course, mean that measured
unemployment is zero; there are always some people moving between jobs or
temporarily unemployed (voluntarily) for other reasons. Such "frictional" unemployment is widely agreed to be unavoidable, even desirable, for a well-functioning market economy. There is much dispute, however, as to how much frictional
unemployment our economy requires. Full employment, then, means measured
unemployment of two per cent, four per cent, or whatever is the appropriate frictional
level, with the further understanding that the number of jobs open and in the process
of being filled is roughly equal to the number of unemployed persons in the
process of moving between jobs.
In recent years there has been much discussion of "structural" unemployment, by
which is usually meant that unemployed persons lack the skills or abilities to fill jobs
that are open, or could be opened by an expansion of demand. To the extent that
our remaining unemployment in the United States is frictional or structural, expanding demand by monetary or fiscal policy will largely raise prices without doing
much to eliminate unemployment. Some of the poverty programs, incidentally, as
well as earlier manpower training legislation, are aimed at reducing structural unemployment via education and training for persons now in low-income families.
There is some evidence from past experience that the level of unemploymentfrictional, structural, and all other kinds-is inversely related to the rate at which
wages and prices creep up. With a sufficiently vigorous demand for goods such
as existed during World War II, virtually everyone can be employed, including those
whom we would now regard as structurally unemployable. The penalty is, of course,
rapidly rising wages and prices which serve, in part, to overcome minimum wage
laws and other cost barriers to the employment of low-productivity workers. At
the other extreme, there seems to be some level of unemployment at which wages do
not rise at all so that rising labor productivity could result in gradually falling
monetary labor costs and, possibly, falling prices of goods. Postwar data seem
to indicate that unemployment of five per cent to six per cent is required for price
stability (rising wages are absorbed by rising labor productivity) whereas an unemployment rate as low as three per cent is likely to be accompanied by price level
increases of 3 per cent to 4! 2 per cent per year.'
' For rough estimates of this nature, see Samuelson & Solow, Analytical Aspects of Anti-inflation
Policy, 50 Am. EcoN. REv. 177 (i96o). Their estimates are based on data from the teens, twcnties,
and postwar period. Including the 1930s would greatly increase the estimate of unemployment consistent with price stability.
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The enormous expansion in the output of goods and services during the period
I96i-1964 was accomplished with virtual price stability. The broadest index of output
prices that we have' advanced 1.3 per cent per year on the average, a figure well
within the range of statistical errors or unrecorded quality improvements in output.
However, unemployment remained above five per cent throughout the period. The
rate of price increase rose in 1965 to 1.8 per cent while unemployment fell to 4.1
per cent at year-end. This recent behavior is quite consistent with the functional
relationship between unemployment and the rate of inflation on which the above
estimate of likely inflation at three per cent unemployment is based.
The President's Council of Economic Advisers is more optimistic (excessively
so, one fears) about avoiding inflation. The Council's latest annual report8 predicts
unemployment of 3% per cent by December 1966, with an increase in the price
level of 1.8 per cent to 1.9 per cent. The year-end prediction of unemployment has
been revised downward to 32 per cent by the Department of Labor, according to
recent press reports, thus bringing the small size of the officially-expected price rise
under further suspicion. The Council's expectation that low 1966 unemployment is
consistent with less inflation than our past record would predict stems from five
allegedly changed factors. First, it is argued that the composition of demand has
been growing and will continue to do so in a "balanced" fashion, i.e., without such
drastic shifts in composition as have characterized some postwar inflationary periods.
Second, labor productivity gains are expected to be larger and more widely distributed than in other post-war periods, thus permitting more union pressure on wages
without cutting business profit margins. Third, the Council finds more responsible
attitudes among business and labor leaders with respect to key price and wage
decisions. Also cited are increased foreign competition and various manpower
development policies which aim at reducing structural unemployment.
In evaluating the Council's position, one is tempted to skepticism. Specifically,
it seems likely that increases in government spending are understated, as are
expected increases in private fixed investment and inventories. One may also doubt
whether spending for residential construction will remain at 1965 levels, though the
rise in interest rates on mortgage credit will certainly contribute to this result. Total
demand, therefore, may well rise more than the Council expects, and, to the extent
that expectations of inflation spread, demand may rise by much more. This development would push unemployment rates lower and prices higher than the Council
forecasts.
Skepticism is also in order as to the balanced nature of additional demand. The
shift toward investment and military spending is reminiscent of the 1955-1957 experience, which period also marked the most rapid price level increase in the postwar
period apart from the Korean build-up and the immediate post-war buying binge.
Reliance on foreign competition, unfortunately, has ominous implications for our
2 The implicit price deflator for gross national product.
'COUNCIL
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balance of payments. It may also be true that unions and businessmen might
avoid price and wage increases in the face of mounting (and possibly understated)
demands, but this remains to be seen. Our own experience to date has not been
reassuring, and the experience of European countries with "income policies" is even
less so. We must also face the possibility of a greatly expanded war effort without
the idle resources of 1941 or (to a lesser extent) i95o. Any sudden rise in military
spending beyond the levels now foreseen could rapidly touch off still other inflationary forces. Consumers and businessmen are sufficiently liquid to increase
expenditures sharply for construction and inventories. A further consideration
suggested by the present uncertainty is the need to avoid committing resources to
long-range projects (such as construction) which cannot be quickly reversed.
It would appear, then, that our choice lies between a very likely rise in the price
level of three per cent to four per cent (with the possibility of steeper rises following
an expanded war effort), or some action to curtail demand.
A price level increase of, say, four per cent per year may seem like a modest
enough figure; yet such a rate, if sustained, would double the price level in about
eighteen years. The inequities of inflation are well known, but we should perhaps
reiterate here some of the most important problems. The systematic provision for
retirement in both public and private funds is a major activity in the United States,
and eighteen or twenty years represents a rather short span in calculations which
normally deal in forty to fifty year periods. It is difficult to imagine the destructive
impact on our pension machinery of widely held expectations that prices might
double every eighteen to twenty years, or increase four- to six-fold during the normal
period of calculation for the accumulation and disposition of funds for retirement.
Worst of all, the burden of inflation falls in large measure on those who are
already poor, or on those at income levels already close to the "poverty line." Poverty
or near-poverty living involves a majority of the aged living on public or private
pensions with fixed dollar incomes. This group is, incidentally, beyond the scope
of the poverty programs, and stands to suffer most from inflation. To the extent
that rising prices force down demand and thus help slow down the rate of inflation,
the segment of society least able to afford lower real incomes (the aged poor) is called
upon to make the largest sacrifice.
The question of poverty is indeed a complex one. Though we should all like
to see poverty disappear, we may well disagree on measures to abolish it. The war in
Viet Nam focuses attention on inflation as a problem which is more serious than at
any time since 1957. There is the strong possibility that some element of aggregate
demand will have to be restrained, so that spending for poverty programs, along
with other types of public and private spending, becomes a target for potential
restraint. We have suggested a cost-benefit test for all types of spending including
the war on poverty; decisions as to where to reduce demand should be based on such
tests. We should face realistically the threat of inflation and its impact on millions
of the poor.

